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TRUSTS WITHOUT EQUITY
GEORGE L. GRETTON*
"Perhaps the greatest difficulty the civilians have in accepting the trust is
caused by what I have come to regard as an English peculiarity logically
detachable from the trust, namely, the distinction between the legal and the
equitable estate. In Scots law, which, even if it did not invent and develop
the trust for itself but took it over from England—the point is doubtful—
has accepted it without inhibitions or reservations, no such distinction has
ever been known. There the trustee becomes owner and the beneficiary
acquires a contractual right against him."1
I. INTRODUCTION
FOR the comparatist the trust is problematic. For this there are two main
reasons. The first is that the slogan of modern comparative law—
"compare function rather than form"—does not work for the trust.2 One
cannot identify the function of the trust because there is no such function.
The trust is functionally protean. Trusts are quasi-entails, quasi-usufructs,
quasi-wills, quasi-corporations,3 quasi-securities over assets/ schemes for
collective investment,5 vehicles for the administration of bankruptcy,
vehicles for bond issues,6 and so on and so forth.7 In software terminology,
trusts are emulators. They are not even confined to private law. They can
exist in public law, and can also straddle the private/public boundary.8
* University of Edinburgh. I would like to thank Lionel Smith for his comments.
1. F. H. Lawson, A Common Lawyer Looks at the Civil Law (1953) p.201.
2. Despite this, valuable attempts to identify "trust-like" devices in non-trust legal
systems have been made: see for instance Hein Kotz, Trust und Treuhand (1963); Christian
de Wulf, The Trust and Corresponding Institutions in the Civil Law (1965); W. A. Wilson
(Ed.), Trusts and Trust-Like Devices (1981).
3. Both non-profit quasi-corporations, such as the Inns of Court, and quasi-companies,
with the shareholders being the beneficiaries and the directors the trustees. For a classic
study see John H. Sears, Trust Estates as Business Companies (2nd edn, 1921).
4. Quasi-mortgages, quasi-pledges, quasi-hypothecs etc. This may be done in three
ways. (1) The debtor transfers assets to a neutral third party to hold as trustee for the lender
and for the debtor. (2) The debtor may transfer to the creditor to hold as trustee for both
parties, (Compare the Roman fiducia cum creditore and its modern versions.) (3) The debtor
may declare a trust over his own assets with himself as trustee, holding for himself and the
lender. All three of these patterns can be found in one jurisdiction or another.
5. The unil trust. Paradoxically, investment trusts, which are also collective investment
schemes, are not trusts.
6. Debenture trusts.
7. "Si Von demande d quoi sen le trust, on peutpresque rtpondrc. 'd tout.' " ("What is the
trust used for? Almost everything." Pierre Lepaulle, Traiii Theorique et Pratique des Trusts
(1932) p.lZ)
8. They are not even confined to national laws: they extend to public international law.
See for instance Catherine Redgwell, Inter generational Trusts and Environmental Protec-
tion (1999).
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The second reason why trusts have proved so problematic for the
comparatisl is that there is a widespread belief that they are a special
product of the common law tradition and, in particular, of its law/equity
duality,9 and thus intrinsically mysterious to the civilian tradition. Trusts
are supposed to be an Athanasian mystery. The Hague Convention on the
Recognition of Trusts tells us that "the trust, as developed in courts of
equity in common law jurisdictions and adopted with some modifications
in other jurisdictions, is a unique legal institution.. .". l0The trust is unique
because it is founded on the division between law and equity and the
consequent division of property rights into legal and equitable. The Privy
Council has said that "the distinction between the legal and the equitable
estate is of the essence of the trust.""
Or again, in the International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law
Professor Fratcher writes:
The trust is a legal device developed in England whereby ownership of
property is split between a person known as a trustee, who has the rights
and powers of an owner, and a beneficiary, for whose exclusive benefit the
trustee is bound to use those rights and powers.12 ... The interest of a
beneficiary is . . . a property interest in the subject matter, it is not a mere
personal or contract claim against the trustee. Neither trustee nor
beneficiary has a mere ius in re aliena. In other words, the interests of both
the trustee and the beneficiary in the subject matter are interests in remP
Because both the trustee and the beneficiary have, concurrently, in rem
interests in the same subject matter, the creation of a trust normally
involves a splitting of ownership.
The trust, it seems, is English, the trust is part of property law, and the
trust is based on a separation between ownership in law and ownership in
equity. Maurice Amos, also writing in comparative vein, took the same
9. "Though the English do not lay exclusive claim to having discovered God, they do
claim to have invented the trust with two natures in one." (T. B. Smith), International
Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law Vol.VI, chap.2, para.262.
10. (Preamble.) As one usually finds in texts where two or more languages are authentic,
there arc significant differences between the authentic versions. The French text reads: "Le
trust est une institution caraairistique crte par tes jurisdictions de I'equitt dans les pays de
common law."
11. Abdul Hameed Silti Kadija v. De Saram [1946] 208 (Ceylon) at 217. (Privy Council,
quoting with approval R. W. Lee, Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law (3rd edn, 1931),
p.372.)
12. This passage is from Vol.VI.chap.il at the beginning of para.1. The following passage
is from the same chapter at the end of para.3 and the beginning of para.4.
13. One may remark that since a ins in re aliena is itself a ius in rem this inference is hard to
follow. The father of modern Dutch law, E. M. Mcijers, wrote that uhet Engelsche
zakenrecht is en zijn constucties en ook in vele zijner regenlinen, eenige eeuewn bij die van het
Europeesche yasteland ten achter." (Quoted H. F. W. D. Fischer at 1957, Tydskrif vir
hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg.25 at 35/36.) This remark is so undiplomatic that it is
better left untranslated. It is also less than fair, but passages such as that quoted in the text
enable one to understand why Meijers descended to invective.
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view: "the heart of the difficulty lies in the fact that trust property has two
contemporaneous owners."14
And yet there have been doubters. Lawson was one.15 Likewise,
Bernard Rudden has written that "the orthodox explanation, given in
terms of the traditional distinction between law and equity, provides only
a historical and not a rational account of the trust."16 The doubters are
right. The trust does not have to be conceptualised within the framework
of English law. The trust presupposes neither equity nor divided
ownership. The ius commune tradition already has the categories with
which to understand the trust. Scots law, which has known the trust since
the 17th century and has more or less successfully integrated it within an
almost pure ius commune system of property law, shows how.17
II. CAN THE TRUST BE EXPLAINED IN TERMS OF THE LAW OF
OBLIGATIONS?
CAN trust be explained as forming part of the law of obligations, perhaps
as a special form of contract? To some extent it can.18 It is too seldom
stressed that to be a trustee a person must so consent." He voluntarily
undertakes the obligations of the trust. The civil law tradition is familiar
with the fiducia cum amico™ in which a person transfers the ownership of
assets to another, for the purpose of administration, the recipient being
bound—as a matter of the law of obligations—to administer them in a
certain manner. How near does that go to the trust?
One objection to seeing trusts as contracts is that the trust does not
obey the dictates of privity theory, but then privity is hardly a universal
truth, and even in the common law world is as honoured in the breach as
in the observance. Stipulatio alteri can achieve a great deal, and indeed
one may suspect that its historical absence from English law21 was a
14. (1936/7) 50 Harvard Law Review 1249, at 1264.
15. See for instance the quotation at the beginning of this article.
16. "Things as Things and Things as Wealth" (1994) 14 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
806, at 89. And cf. the same author's remark that "while the separation [between law and
equity] may be the historical reason for the invention of the trust concept, it does not seem
an adequate analytical reason, for it fails to explain the Scottish trust." ("Equity as Alibi" in
Stephen Goldstein (Ed.), Equity and Contemporary Legal Developments (1992), at p.36.
17. This article has the ambitious aim of trying to catch the essence of the trust, whether
used for private or for commercial purposes. Inevitably, however, it cannot investigate all
the manifold uses to which trusts are put.
18. Cf. J. H. Langbein, "The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts" [1995] 105 Yale
LJ. 625.
19. In the normal case. There can also be cases of trusteeship by force of law, without
contract. But it is, after all, a general truth that obligations may arise ex lege as well as ex
voluntate.
20. The Verwaltungstreuhand of German law corresponds to this form of fiducia. For
fiducia in general in Roman law see Inst Gaii 2,60.
21. England has recently made further inroads into privity by the Contracts (Rights of
Third Parties) Act 1999. For privity and trusts see N. G. Jones, "UsesTrusts and the Paths to
Privity" (1997) 56 C.LJ. 175.
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motive for the development of the trust, with its freedom from the
shackles of privity. It is also true that the trust does not conform to
classical notions of contract formation, but few today would regard that as
a point of great significance. Nineteenth century theories of contract
formation have been eroded by experience and by reflection.
Another possible objection to the attempt to understand the trust as a
sort of contract is the fact that a beneficiary can in some circumstances
hold liable a third party who acquires trust property in bad faith. This fact
is often held up as an illustration of the semi-real nature of the
beneficiary's right. But nothing is more common than for legal systems to
provide that if A breaks his contract with B as a result of collusion with C,
C may have some liability to B.22 It does not follow that a right is real
merely because the holder of that right can claim the protection of the law
against interference by third parties.23
If C did not act in bad faith but took gratuitously, he may be liable to B,
where A is a trustee and B is a beneficiary, but again this is not so
surprising: all legal systems provide that gratuitous transfers are potenti-
ally reversible where the transferor is insolvent24—and if he is solvent B
should suffer no loss anyway.
Another objection to the "obligational" view of the trust is that it does
not explain why breach of trust may attract criminal sanctions. But this is
not a special feature of the trust: persons in a fiduciary position may be
prosecuted for fraud, and there are many fiduciaries apart from trustees.
And the concept of a fiduciary exists also in the civil law tradition.23
In brief: trusts are capable of generating both third party rights and
third party liabilities. But the same is true of contract law. There are,
indeed, some differences, in these areas, between trusts and contracts, but
the differences are matters of detail.
The main difficulty in the obligational view of trusts is that it does not
explain the effect of the trust in relation to the rights of creditors—the
22. Tony Honor* has written that "the conclusion must be that civil law systems are
capable of protecting the trust beneficiary by the doctrine of notice to the same extent as
does English law by its recourse to equitable interests in property." ("Obstacles to the
Reception of the Trust? The Examples of South Africa and Scotland" in A. M. Rabello
(Ed.), Aeqiiitas and Equity (1997).)
23. A point well made within the Anglo-American tradition by Harlan Stone: "The
Rights of the Cestui Que Trust" (1917) 17 Columbia Law Review 467.
24. That is to say, the set of rules whereby donations, and other juridical acts, by an
insolvent debtor, which have the effect of diminishing the value of the debtor's estate, may
be voidable at the instance of the unpaid creditors. The detailed rules vary from one legal
system to another but (at least in the civil law world) all derive from the aciio pauliana.
25. Tutor rem pup Mi emtre non potesv. idemquc porrigendum at ad similia; id at ad
curatores procurators el qui negotia aliens gerunt. (Dig.18,1,34, 7. "A tutor cannot buy a
thing belonging to his ward; this rule extends to other persons with similar responsibilities,
that is curators, procurators and those who conduct another's affairs." (Translation per Alan
Watson's edition.)
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"insolvency effect". This (the priority which the beneficiaries have over
the trustee's creditors) is surely the central fact of the trust which any
theory must recognise and explain.26 If the trust is in its essence a contract,
it will not defeat the rights of the owner's other creditors.
III. TRUST AS AGENCY?
SOMETHING like a trust can be created by locating ownership in the
"beneficiary", and conferring on the "trustee" extensive contractual
powers, including powers of alienation. Such an arrangement can involve
"mandate without representation."27 If things are done in this way, the
insolvency effect is explained: the creditors of the "trustee" are defeated,
because it is the "beneficiary" who is the owner. In the bewind of Dutch
law, and of the Roman-Dutch systems of southern Africa, we see this idea
developed into a formal institution.28 But though it functions as a trust,
the bewind is not trust, for a simple reason: the location of legal title is the
reverse of the trust.29
IV. DO THE BENEFICIARIES HAVE RIGHTS IN REMt
So is Professor Fratcher right in saying that "the trust is a legal device
developed in England whereby ownership of property is split"?30 Is the
Privy Council right to say that "the distinction between the legal and the
equitable estate is of the essence of the trust"?31 Is Amos right to say that
"trust property has two contemporaneous owners"?32 Is it true that "the
26. This is so even though most reported trust cases do not turn on this issue. As a
comparison, the central doctrine of company law is the separate personality of the company,
even if most reported company law cases do not turn on this point.
27. This conceptualisation of the trust was common in Scots law in the 17th and 18th
centuries. Trust was often described as a combination of deposition and mandatum, with the
depositum being a deposit of ownership rather than possession. See further James
Dalrymple (Lord Stair), Institution of the Law ofScotland (1681) 1,13,7 and 4,63; Andrew
McDouall (Lord Bankton), Institute of the Laws of Scotland (1751) 1,18,12; John Erskine,
Institute of the Law of Scotland (1773) 3,1,32.
28. However, it does not seem to be used much in practice, either in the Netherlands or in
Southern Africa. In Heritable Reversionary Co. v. Millar (1892) 19 R.(H.L.)43 Lord Watson
opined that in the Scottish trust the beneficiaries are the owners and the trustee has no real
right—in the effect the bewind concept. But this was a maverick view, shared by no one
before or since. Something like the bewind exists in the Ermitchtigungslreuhand in Austrian
law. (See generally Peter Apathy (Ed.), Die Treuhandschaft (1995).)
29. Interestingly, South African legislation classifies the bewind as a sort of trust: see the
Trust Property Control Act 1988. The South African view is that what is important is not so
much ownership as control. (See also H. R. Hahlo at (1961) 78 South African Law Journal
195.) As against this, one may argue that if control, rather than ownership, is the test, then
company directors would be "trustees." But company directors, though occasionally called
trustees, are fiduciaries but not trustees.
30. International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law Vol. VI, chap.l 1, para.l.
31. Abdul Hameed Sitti Kadija v. De Saram [1946] 208 (Ceylon) at 217. (Privy Council,
quoting with approval R. W. Lee, Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law (3rd edn, 1931),
p372.)
32. (1936/7) 50 Harvard Law Review 1249, at 1264.
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dual division of title into formal or legal ownership and substantial or
bonitary ownership is essential to the trust"?3-1 Turning the question
around, is it true that "the ... basic obstacle to acceptance of the trust [in
legal systems with a civilian property law] is the concept of autonomous
and indivisible ownership"?*1 (It is important to emphasise that these
quotations—and others in similar vein might be cited—were not intended
by their authors to be confined to English law.)
Are beneficial rights proprietary, or real, rights? Is ownership divided?
One reason why the question is so difficult is that it can be asked at
different levels. As a question addressed to the individual systems of the
common law tradition, the answer has to be affirmative.35 It is true that
even within that tradition there have been doubters, but the "in rem" view
has come to prevail. And it might be argued that that is the only level—the
level of particular legal systems—at which the question makes sense.
There is no Begriffshimmel, no "heaven of concepts." But that is too short
an answer. Lawyers from different traditions have to speak with each
other, and not merely by way of academic debate. No one would say that,
since "sale" has no absolute system-neutral meaning, therefore the
Convention on the International Sale of Goods is a pointless exercise.
And especially within the European Union we have to try to understand
each other. The very existence of the Union, with its constantly-
expanding sphere of Union-wide legislation, means that there has to be a
system-neutral background of shared legal ideas. I do not wish to say
anything of the idea of the ius commune europaeum novum except to
observe that in some sense it must exist already, for Union legislation
must use law-bound language.
Thus there is a problem: a system-neutral language is both necessary
and impossible. I cannot resolve this antinomy. What this article attempts
to do, is to understand the trust from an admittedly civilian standpoint,
33. J. Garrigucs, "Law of Trusts" (1953) 2 American Journal of Comparative Law 25, at
33.
34. V. Bolgar, "Why no Trusts in the Civil Law?" (1953) 2 American Journal of
Comparative Law 204, at 210.
35. Beneficial rights arc personal rights in English law, it is true, but the key point is that
they are also proprietary. Some scholars have agonised over this. Maitland: "If a foreign
friend asked me to tell him in one word whether the right of the English DestinUr (the person
for whom property is held in trust) is dinglich or obligatorisch, I should be inclined to say:
'No, I cannot do that. If I said dinglich, that would be untrue. If I said obligatorisch, I should
suggest what is false. In the ultimate analysis the right may be obligatorisch, but for many
practical purposes of great importance it has been treated as though it were dinglich, and
indeed people habitually speak and think of it as a kind of Eigenthtim." (H. A. L. Fisher
(Ed.), Collected Papers of Frederick William Maitland (1911) Vol.111, at p.326. For
Maitland's thoughts on how, historically, the beneficial interest evolved from a personal
right into a quasi-real right, sec his Equity chap.9 (pp.112-114 of the 1949 edition). But
Maitland's views remain (that beneficial rights are not truly real) a minority one.
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but at least a standpoint which is not tied to any particular civilian system.
And here Scots law offers a singularly good point of entry. It is a mixed
system whose property law is a remarkably pure ius commune system,36
but which, nonetheless, has had the trust at least in a rudimentary
form—since the 17th century—a far longer period than the other mixed
systems—and which, moreover, has the trust as part of its unenacted law.
The basics of the Scots law of trusts do not hang upon the construction of a
statutory text.
On that basis, and in that sense, what are the objections to regarding the
right of a trust beneficiary as a real right?17
(1) A real right is presumptively valid erga omnes. By contract, a
beneficial right is not.38
(2) If the right of the beneficiary is real, how is it that a person
acquiring from the trustee can take free from the rights of the
beneficiary? If the beneficiary's right is personal, the difficulty
disappears: the third party is acquiring from the owner, and no
other real rights affect the asset.
(3) In international private law beneficial interests behave much
more like personal rights than like real rights.
(4) In general, real rights in immovables can be, and usually must
be, registered, whilst personal rights do not need to be, and in
general cannot be, registered.39 In this respect beneficial rights
follow personal rights.
(5) The rights of the beneficiary are transferable in the same
manner as any personal rights, namely by assignment or
cession, and not by the means used for the transfer of real rights.
36. The standard text is K. G. C Reid, Law of Properly in Scotland (1996).
37. In the following 1 do not mention the well-known argument that a beneficial right in a
trust cannot be a real right because of the numerus clausus of real rights. This argument is
valid in the context of international private law, when the courts of Utopia (where the trust is
now known) have to decide what effect to give, in Utopia, to a foreign trust. If Utopia has a
numerus clausus of real rights, the right of a beneficiary cannot be real to the extent that it is
subject to the internal law of Utopia. That is certainly a cogent position. But the numerus
clausus argument is no answer to the argument that the beneficial right is indeed real in the
jurisdictions which admit it. The nature and number of real rights was not fixed for all time
by Ulpian or Tribonian or Accursius or Voet or Windscheid. It is a conception capable of
change and development. If, say, French law wishes to adopt the trust, Vie doctrine of
numerus clausus is no obstacle.
38. The fact that a purchaser in bad faith may be liable to the beneficiary has nothing very
special about it: most legal systems have some such rule, whereby X, buying from an owner
Y, in knowledge of Z's personal rights against Y, may be liable to Z. (Details of the rule
naturally vary from one jurisdiction to another.)
39. Obviously there is considerable variation between different systems, but this
principle will be generally found to be reliable.
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(6) Real rights are normally subject to the "principle of specificity".
They are like labels glued to particular things. Consider the
paradigm examples: ownership, servitude, pledge. But ben-
eficial rights attach not so much to things as to funds, whose
contents are—or may be—constantly shifting while at the same
time the fund continues as an entity. Where a beneficial right
involves a right to a particular asset—as where A conveyed land
to B for A's own use while A went off to crusade—there may be
some plausibility about describing it as real. That plausibility
declines where the beneficial right is a right simply to money,
without reference to any particular asset at all.
(7) Beneficial rights are often indeterminate. It may be certain that
a person is a beneficiary and yet it may be wholly uncertain what
his rights are. It may even be wholly uncertain whether he will
ever benefit at all—a strong example of this being the dis-
cretionary trust.40 Moreover, the very identity of beneficiaries
may be indeterminate, as where a trust confers benefits on the
unborn issue of a named person. Whilst personal rights can
(more or less) be reconciled with this sort of thing, real rights
cannot.41 Of course, some beneficial rights might be real and
others not: but that seems rather arbitrary.
(8) The central problem of the trust is to explain the insolvency
effect—the fact that the rights of the beneficiaries are, in
principle, unaffected by the insolvency of the trustee. If the
rights of beneficiaries were real, that would be an explanation.
Yet it seems to be accepted that there exist at least some kinds
of trust where it is senseless to attribute equitable ownership to
the beneficiaries. Charitable trusts are examples of this, as are
other "purpose" trusts, and indeed even in discretionary private
trusts arguably examples may also be found.42 Yet the insol-
vency effect operates in all trusts regardless of whether the rights
40. The fact that, even within the conceptual structure of the common law, beneficiaries
may have not rights in rent, is a point stressed by Maurizio Lupoi: sec his Introduiione al
Trust (1994) and Trusts (1997).
41. It must, however, be conceded that the civilian tradition has sometimes been rather
wobbly on this point. Take Ari.629 of the Austrian Civil Code (ABGB): "Das Eigcntum des
Fideicommiss-Vcrmogens ist iwischcn alien AnwSrtem ttnd dem jedesmaligen Rdeicom-
miss-lnhabcr geteilt. Jenen kommt das Obereigentum allein; diesem aber audi das Nutiung-
seigtntum zu." (The ownership of entailed property is split between the heirs in expectancy
and the heir in possession. To the former belongs the dominium direcium; to the latter the
dominium utile.) This was, understandably, disapproved of by the pandectists as being
uncivilian. It was repealed immediately after the Anschluss in 1938, and was not revived with
the restoration of Austrian independence. Thus the Nazis spread that Pandectism of which
they disapproved. This one codal provision deserves an article to itself.
42. For discussion see e.g. R. A. Pearce & i. Stevens, Law of Trusts and Equitable
Obligations (1998) pp.418^»20.
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of the beneficiaries are "real" or not. Thus the theory that
beneficial rights are real does not even solve the problem for
which it was created. It is—at best—the fifth wheel on the car.43
(9) It is often remarked that the trustee is treated as owner "only"
as regards third parties, whilst as between trustee and benefici-
ary it is the beneficiary who is owner. But this is a muddle, and in
fact the true conclusion is the opposite one: beneficial rights are
in fact not real. Real rights are defined primarily in terms of
third party effect.44 The fact that in third-party terms—for
instance in suing an intruder for trespass or registering a
title—it is the trustee who is owner shows where ownership lies.
There is nothing mysterious or puzzling about an owner who
undertakes, by way of obligation, to hold the whole benefit for
someone else: to call that "divided ownership" is
mystification.45
The Court of Justice has been obliged to consider whether a beneficial
right is a real right in the context of Article 16 of the Brussels
Convention.46 This provides that in an action concerning "rights in rent in
immovable property'1 jurisdiction belongs to the courts of the country
where the property is situated. Quoted here is the official English
translation. The original text was of course not drafted in English. The
French text speaks of droits riels immobiliers. A Scots lawyer would not
translate this as "rights in rem" but as "real rights",47 but EU texts and
international conventions naturally have their English language version
framed in terms of English law, and the same is true when they are
transposed into domestic UK law by Westminster legislation. Though
natural,, this can be problematic for the Scots lawyer, as the present
example illustrates. In Webb v. Webb48 the Court of Justice had to decide
what Article 16 meant in relation to trusts. A father bought property in
France but arranged for the son to be registered as owner. Later they fell
out, and the father sued in the English courts for a declaration that the son
held for the father on trust. One line of defence for the son was that this
43. A connected point is that the trusts assets themselves may be partially or wholly
personal rights (even "equitable" rights), and it could hardly be that the rights of the
beneficiaries arc real while those of the trustee are personal.
44. Robinson Crusoe had no law. When an island has two people, there must be law—ubi
societal ibi ius—but only personal rights are needed, not real rights. Real rights will arrive
with the third castaway.
45. A similar muddle occurs in the Sale of Goods Act 1979. The heading above s.16 reads:
"Transfer of property as between seller and buyer."
46. Transposed into UK law by the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982.
47. Other European languages use the local vernacular term too, not the Latin. It is
curious that it should be English law that uses the Latin phrase. Presumably this is because
the traditional meaning of "real" in English law is "immovable."
48. [1994] E.C.R. 1-1717 (Court of Justice Case No.C-294/92).
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was an action in rem and so the English courts did not have jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeal referred the matter to Luxembourg, which held that
Article 16 did not apply, because the action did not concern real rights in
French property. There has been some disquiet in England about this
decision. To a Scots lawyer it looks obviously correct. In Scots law the
right of a beneficiary is a personal right and not a real right. So what
conclusion can we draw from the decision? The natural conclusion is that
the term right in rem as used by lawyers in the common law tradition does
not precisely correspond to the civilian conception of a real right.49 Right
in rem is a wider conception: it includes rights regarded as real rights in the
civilian tradition but it includes some other rights too. Hence the official
English version of Article 16 is a mistranslation. Or at least so it seems
when viewed from north of the border, and also, it seems, from
Luxembourg.
A connected terminological point concerns the word "proprietary." In
the common law systems it is natural to distinguish remedies (and rights)
into personal and proprietary. When translating into civilian terminology,
one must be careful. Many "proprietary" remedies and rights are, in
civilian terms, real, but others are not. For instance, it is unclear to what
extent Scots law recognises a right to trace. But to the extent that it does,
the right is not classifiable as "proprietary",50 since the tracer has no real
right. The point is primarily linguistic rather than substantive.
The legal realist will be impatient with all this agonising about whether
a right is real or not. Concepts should be our servants and not our masters.
But we cannot escape formalism. Those who claim to reject formalism are
fellow formalists with a rival theory of their own.
V. TRUST AS PATRIMONY
THE concept of patrimony is that of the totality of a person's assets, and, in
its broader sense, his liabilities also. It is sometimes supposed to have
been an invention of 19th century legal scholars. That view might seem to
receive support if one looks at most standard texts on Roman law, which
refer to patrimonium only in the sense of the patrimonium caesaris, the
imperial patrimony. But that view is quite wrong. For example, only a
little research in the sources is necessary to show that the later civilian
concept of patrimony, or something pretty near it, already existed in
Roman law. The word patrimonium is used in this sense by Papinian,51 by
49. "It is almost impossible to convey to continental lawyers the exact sense in which an
English lawyer uses the terms in rem and in penonam." H. C. Gutteridge, Comparative Law
(1946) p. 123. That is perceptive. One might add that it is almost impossible to convey to
Anglo-American lawyers the exact sense in which a civilian lawyer uses the terms "real" and
"personal."
50. The word "proprietary" is not normally used in Scots law, being a word heavily laden
with the doctrines of English equity.
51. DigJl.77.19.
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Paul,32 by Pomponius," by Scaevola,54 and by Ulpian.55 The concept was
to be developed later in the civilian tradition, but it has been there from
almost the beginning. What happened in the 19th century was, rather, a
reaction against the idea of special patrimonies and in favour of a single
general patrimony."
This is not the place to elaborate on the concept of patrimony, though it
may be observed that one of its benefits is to remove a terrible temptation:
the temptation to equate what is mine with what I own. All my rights are
mine, but not all my rights are rights of ownership. One of the first lessons
of property law is to distinguish real rights from personal rights, and,
amongst the real rights, to distinguish ownership on the one hand from
the limited real rights on the other hand. If I am owner of a thing and enter
into an unexecuted contract of sale with you, my patrimony still, at this
stage, has the real right, while in your patrimony there is a personal right.
In my patrimony there is also a personal right, to the price, while in the
larger sense of patrimony we both have obligations: my obligation to
convey and deliver and your obligation to pay and accept.
The concept of patrimony, or something much the same, is known also
to English law, under the name of "estate"" or, sometimes, "fund."58
"Estate" has more than one meaning, but in the sense of winding up the
"estate" of a deceased person, or administering the "estate" of a
bankrupt, the word is being used too in the sense of patrimony.
In general, the principle is: one person, one patrimony. Everyone has a
patrimony, no one has more than one. But the civilian tradition admitted
qualifications to this principle. As well as his ordinary patrimony, a person
could sometimes have a "special patrimony." (Such as dos orpeculium in
the Roman law.) For example, matrimonial property regimes sometimes
necessitated the existence of a special patrimony.59 In such a special
52. Dig.10.2.38.
53. Dig.46.6.9. This passage, however, excludes claims (nomina) from the concept. That is
different from the modem concept. The fact that Roman law at that time had not fully
developed the institution of cessio (assignment) is a partial explanation.
54. Dig.12.6.61.
55. Dig.5J.25. These citations are illustrative, not exhaustive.
56. "It has often been considered in civil law countries that 'each person has a patrimony,
each person has only one patrimony.' This construction is essentially due to the reading by
some French authors of some provisions of the French Civil Code." Michel Grimaldi and
Francois Barriere in Arthur Hartkamp (Ed.), Towards a European Civil Code (2nd edn,
1998), at p.578.
57. Herbots has written that "English law has . . . no theory either of estate or of
personality." ("We/ Engels recht keni... geen iheorie van het vermogen, noch een theorie van
de rechtspersoon") J. H. Herbots (Ed.), Lt Trust el la Fiducie (1997), at p.7. That goes too
far, though one can see why, from a continental standpoint, Herbots was tempted to say it.
58. There is not much discussion of the concepts of patrimony and special patrimony in
the English language. On this lack see Ansay, "Third Way?" in J. Basedow, K. J. Hopt & H.
K8tz (Eds), Festschrift fitr Ulrich Drobnig (1998).
59. In which case it should perhaps have been called a matrimony.
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patrimony there is real subrogation, i.e. the principle that a thing bought
with money from that source was part of that special patrimony, and
conversely.60 Thus the assets of the special patrimony are segregated from
the general patrimony, and to some extent the civilian tradition has
likewise accepted segregation of liabilities also. Real subrogation is the
key to the doctrine of patrimony, and patrimony is the key to the trust.
In other words, a trust is a special patrimony. There is nothing
surprising about this conclusion," except that it has not been more widely
understood. One frequently meets continental lawyers who fret and
puzzle about the trust, to whom the trust is an arcanum, to be understood
only in terms of the mysteries of equity, those who have swallowed whole
that remarkable statement in the preamble to the Hague Convention on
the Recognition of Trusts about the trust being a "unique legal
institution" which was "developed in courts of equity in common law
jurisdictions", those who accept at face value the assertion that the right
of the beneficiary is a right in rem. Yet the civilian tradition actually has
and has always had the appropriate concepts.62 There is an irony here.
Here are three pictures. The first shows the ordinary case of one person
and his patrimony, the patrimony being a bag with two parts, namely the
liabilities and the assets. The second is the case of the person who is also a
trustee: it illustrates the essential principle of one person, but two
patrimonies. The third shows the trust which has two trustees. Their title
is a "joint" one, as opposed to co-ownership: that is a necessary feature of
the trust.63
60. For the history, sec Arno Welle In universalibus pretium succedit in locum rei, res in
locum pretii: eine Untenuchung zur Ennvicklungsgeschlchtc der dinglichen Surrogation bei
SondervermOgen (1987).
61. The point was developed by the French comparalist Pierre Lepaullc in his Traiti
Thtorique et Practique des Trusts (1932). This is one of the seminal treatments of the subject.
One area where Lcpaulle's thought was influential is Latin America. (It was eventually
published in a Spanish version in Mexico: Tratado teorico y pratico de los trusts (1975).) For
Lepaulle's thoughts near the end of his life sec "The Strange Destiny of Trusts" in Roscoe
Pound (Ed.), Perspectives of Law: Essays for Austin Wakeman Scott (1964).
62. To what extent the civilian concepts go back to Roman law itself, and to what extent
they are post-Roman developments, is open to debate. H. Patrick Glenn concludes that "the
trust ... is part of a pan-European tradition and was developed in opposition to another
pan-European tradition, that of Roman law." ("The Historical Origins of the Trust" in A.
M Rabello (Ed.), Aequitasand Equity (1997).) Glenn's essay is of value but the second part
of the sentence quoted goes too far.
63. Joint ownership may be compared with the Gesamthandcigcntum as opposed to the
Mileigentum of German law.
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With the explanation of trust as patrimony everything falls into place. The
rights of beneficiaries are personal rights.64 They are personal rights
against the trustee,65 enforceable against the special patrimony. (And
sometimes, depending on the legal system and the circumstances of the
case, against the general patrimony also.66) Conversely, personal rights
64. Are they founded on promise or on contract? Or perhaps they are another form of
voluntary obligation? 1 would analyse the trust obligation as a special form of promise. But
the question is probably of limited importance. A more interesting question is whether
beneficiaries need to have any rights at all. It may be that benefit can be separated from
enforccabilily, and in fact this is one of the current issues in international trust law. For
perceptive discussion sec Paul Matthews, "The New Trust: Obligations without Rights?" in
A. J. Oakley (Ed.), Trends in Contemporary Trust Law (1996). See also Paul Baxendalc-
Walker Purpose Trusts (1999). A trust of this sort is especially problematic in legal systems
which recognise the division of ownership, for it means that the trustees have legal
ownership (and nothing more) but the equitable ownership is in a void. Actually this is yet
another argument to show that beneficial rights cannot be real.
63. Lcpaulle did not agree. For him the rights of the beneficiaries, though personal, were
enforceable against (he trust rather than against the trustee. Likewise, the duties of the
trustees were owed, not to the beneficiaries, but to the trust itself. (Traiti Theorique el
Pratique des Trusts (1932), pp.42-44.) This view of matters virtually turns the trust into a
juristic person. Thus shareholders have rights against (he company, not against the directors,
and directors owe their duties to the company, not to the shareholders.
66. These personal rights form, of course, part of the beneficiary's patrimony.
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enforceable against the trustee in his personal capacity are not (in
general) enforceable against the special patrimony. There is thus no need
to seek to classify the right of beneficiaries as being in some way privileged
or quasi-real or as in some way "trumping" the rights of the creditors of a
trustee in his personal capacity. There is no need to resort to duality of
ownership. Instead of duality of ownership, there is duality of patrimony.
As for the fact that a trust estate is a "fund" the constituent items of which
may change without changing the identity of the fund, this is of the
essence of the idea of a patrimony. It is also essential to the trust concept.
Indeed the chief reason why the German Treuhand falls short of the trust
is that in the Treuhand real subrogation does not fully operate.67 (There
may, indeed, be subrogation (Surrogation) in respect of the "internal"
relationship, that is to say, as between Treuhdnder and Treugeber, but this
has no "external" effect.)
Far from beneficial trust rights having priority, they are in fact
postponed claims. For if a trust becomes insolvent, the claims of the
beneficiaries are postponed to the claims of those who are creditors of the
trust. If anything needs to be explained, it is this fact. But the explanation
is not difficult. It is the explaining of priority which is difficult—very
difficult indeed unless one invokes the idea of a real right. But explaining
postponement is unproblematic. (And no one would seek to argue that
ordinary creditors of a trustee all have real rights.) The conception is
simple: a beneficial right is a personal right which is to be met only when
creditors have been provided for. (Indeed, in commercial transactions
subordinated debt is common and can be created purely by contract.)
The patrimonial conception of the trust also explains, or at least
underlies the explanation of, other features. It helps to explain why a trust
will not fail for want of a trustee, so that even if all the trustees die the trust
continues, and new trustees can be appointed.68 It helps to explain how it
is that a court can take a trust out of the hands of the existing trustees and
place it in the hands of new trustees. It explains why a trust estate, as such,
67. The German Unmillelbarkeilsprinzip, according to which assets held in Treuhand are
protected from creditors of the Trcuh&ndcr only if they are the original "trust" assets—i.e.
the exclusion of real subrogation—strikes me as lacking a stateable basis in legal doctrine. If
there is a special patrimony then there must be real subrogation. If there is no special
patrimony, the immunity to creditors is inexplicable (unless the right of the beneficiary is
real). KOtz admits that the insolvency effect of the Treuhand is "incompatible with the
theory that the beneficiaries' interest in the Treuhand res is a mere right in penonam." (Hein
KOtz, "National Report for Germany" in D. J. Hayton, S. C. J. J. Kortmann & H. L, E.
Verhagcn, Principles of European Trust Law (1999) 85, at 94.) The term "quasidinglich"
which is sometimes encountered in the German literature merely masks the problem. The
current German law lacks conceptual coherence. It may be added that KOtz has taken the
view that the refusal of the German courts to allow real subrogation in Treuhand does not
reflect any basic principle of German law. (See H. KOtz, "Die 15 Haager Konferenz unddas
Kollisionsrecht des Trust" (1986) 50 Rabels Zeitschrift 562, at 579/580.)
68. A point which Lepaulle considered to be of the highest significance.
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can be made bankrupt, at any rate in Scots law69 and in South African
law.70
So can trusts be located in the civil law taxonomy of private law? They
can. Trusts do, indeed, impinge deeply upon both the law of obligations
and the law of property, but they do not belong essentially to either. They
belong to the doctrine of patrimony, and the doctrine of patrimony
belongs to the law of persons.71 The trust is itself not a person. A special
patrimony never is. But a special patrimony operates very like a person,
as an autonomous, quasi-personal, fund.
The patrimonial model of the trust here advanced is not an original one.
Others have said much the same. According to the Principles of European
Trust Law,12 "in a trust, a person called the 'trustee' owns assets
segregated from his private patrimony and must deal with these assets for
the benefit of another person called the 'beneficiary' or for the further-
ance of the trust." Liechtenstein law provides that "the trust estate is to be
treated as a separate patrimony and the creditors of the trustee have no
claim on it."71 Again Tony Honor6 has written that "the trust estate is a
separate fund vested in the trustee... The conception of a separate fund is
not confined to common law systems. Other systems of law admit or have
admitted the idea: for example the peculium of Roman law, the
patrimoine d'affectation of French law, the Sondervermogen of German
law."74 F. H. Lawson remarks that "in the common law countries a
Sondervermogen can easily be created by means of a trust."75 Frans
Sonneveldt observes concisely that "the trustee has actually two
patrimonies."76
The Hague Convention on the Recognition of Trusts77 is of particular
interest to the comparatist since it attempts to explain the trust in a more
or less system-neutral manner. "The term 'trust' refers to the legal
69. Bain (1901) 9 S.L.T. 14; Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act, s.6(1)(a).
70. Magnum Financial Holdings (Ply) Ltd v. Summerly 1984 1 S.A. 160.
71. This is their home, but like most items in any taxonomy there are cross-overs, and it
cannot be denied that trusts must be mentioned under the heads of obligations and property.
Those who are sceptical of this whole approach will say that (his is tantamount to admitting
the trust as an autonomous conception that cannot be located in the taxonomy. I would not
agree. After all, the entirety of the law of persons, natural and juristic, is permeated by the
law of obligations and the law of property.
72. D. J. Hayton, S. C. J. J. Kortmann and H. L. E. Verhagen (Eds) (1999).
73. "Das Treuhandvermdgen fist] ah FremdvermOgen zu betrachien und es haben daher
die GlSubigcr des Treuhltnders hierauf keinen Anspruch." Personen- und Cesellschaftrecht
Art.915. (Text from M. Lupoi, Trust Laws of the World (2000) Vol.11 p.l 159.)
74. "Obstacles to the Reception of Trust Law? The Examples of South Africa and
Scotland" in A. M. Rabello, Acquitas and Equity: Equity in Civil Law and Mixed
Jurisdictions (1997) 793, at 812.
75. International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law Vol. VI, chap.2, para.42.
76. Frans Sonneveldt and Harrie van Mcns, The Trust: Bridge or Abyss between Common
and Civil Law Jurisdictions? (1992) p.5.
77. Implemented in the UK by the Recognition of Trusts Act 1987.
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relationship created—inter vivos or on death—by a person, the settlor,
when assets have been placed under the control of a trustee for the benefit
of a beneficiary or for a specified purpose. A trust has the following
characteristics: (a) The assets constitute a separate fund and are not part
of the trustee's own estate, (b) Title to the trust assets stands in the name
of the trustee or in the name of another person on behalf of the trustee.
.. ."
78
 This may not be perfect, but it avoids equity and divided ownership,
and "separate fund" is special patrimony.79
VI. PATRIMONY AND PERSONALITY
IN Roman law universitas meant a group, considered as a unity. A flock of
sheep was a universitas. As with sheep so with persons: groups of people,
considered as a group, was a universitas.80 A patrimony was a universitas.
The haereditas iacens, which was what the patrimony was called after the
death but before the entry of the heir, was a universitas. A universitas of
this sort became known in the ius commune as a universitas rerum (or
bonorum or iuris)M to distinguish it from a universitas personarum (or
hominum).82 A universitas personarum was considered as a person—a
corporation—in Roman law.83 Roman law did not quite take that step for
the universitas rerum, though it came close to it in some cases, such as the
haereditas iacens.
But every such collectivity is potentially a person. "Universitas" itself
has both meanings. Eventually the civil law tradition came to recognise
two sorts of juristic person: the universitas personarum, the corporation,
and the universitas rerum, the foundation.84 (The common law tradition
78. The Convention is authentic in English and French. The French text reads: "Auxfins
de la prisente convention, le terme 'trust' vise les relations juridiques crties par une ptnonne,
le constituant—par acte entre vifs ou a cause de mort—lorsque des biens ont ttts places sous le
controle du trustee dans Vinttret d'un btntficiare ou dans un but dttermint. Le trust prisente
les caraairistiques suivanles: (a) Les biens du trust constituent une masse distinct et ne font
pas partie du patrimoine du trustee, (b) Le titre relatifaux biens du trust est ttabli au nom du
trustee oud'une autre personne pourle compte de trustee." Masse can mean general or special
patrimony, but tends to be used only in certain contexts, such as bankruptcy.
79. All the more curious that the Convention's preamble (see earlier) is so unsatisfactory.
80. "Universitas alia rerum est, ut grex, peculium, hereditas; alia hominum, veluti
collegium licitum, munidpium, civitas, vicus, pagus." Johannes Voet, Commentarius ad
Pandectas. (Liber HI, Titulus IV, I. One kind of universitas is of things, such as a herd or a
peculium or a hereditas. The other kind is of persons, such as an authorised guild, a
municipality, a city, a village or a canton.)
81. In German a Sachgesamtheit.
82. In German a Personengesamtheii.
83. Roman law did not have a developed theory of juristic personality, but the statement
in the text can be defended from the charge of being anachronistic.
84. In Latin, French and German: fundatio, fondation, Stiftung. To what extent this
conceptualisation was due to Savigny, and to what extent it is medieval, I am unqualified to
discuss. On this see the work of Feenstra, such as "L'Histoire des Fondations" (1956) 24
Tijdschrift voor Rcchtsgeschiedenis 381, and "Foundations in Continental law since the 12th
century" in Richard Helmhob & Reinhard Zimmermann (Eds), Itinera Fidudae (1998).
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has not gone down this road, recognising only corporations.83) A
foundation is a juristic person which is not a corporation. It has no
members. It is an autonomous patrimony dedicated to a purpose—a
ZweckvermOgen. Some writers regarded the Zweckvermdgen as having
no owner at all. Others described it as owning itself.86 Others argued that
it was "owned" by the "purpose" itself. Others again argued that
notionally one could distinguish the juristic person (though memberless)
from the estate which was owned: this latter is the dominant conception.
All this casts light on a variety of difficulties. Article 1261 of the Quebec
Civil Code reads thus:
Le patrimoine fiduciare, formt des biens transfiris en fiducie, constitue un
patrimoinc d'affectation autonome et distinct de celui du constituant, du
fiduciaire, ou du binificiare, sur lequelaucun d'entreeux n'a de droit riel.*1
In Quebec law trust assets are ownerless. This, at first sight startling,
conception is actually part of the civil law tradition: we have here the
patrimony which is wholly autonomous, which has been divorced from
any personality, but which has not become a personality in its own right.
Lepaulle, who influenced the QuSbecois conception, took the view that:
"It is impossible to translate the rights of the trustee into those of an
'owner' in our [i.e. French or, more broadly, civilian] conception of
property. He has neither usus nor fructus nor abusus.nga One understands
the logic, but it is not an inescapable one. Scots law, whose system of
property law is at least as civilian as that of France, is able to say that the
trustee is owner. Indeed, he does have the rights of usus and fructus and
abusus: it is merely that he is under an obligation to use those rights for
others.
Personality and patrimony are not wholly separate concepts. Universi-
tas could mean either. If one recognises personality one must recognise
patrimony: personality implies patrimony. But in addition, as soon as one
85. Both traditions have their conceptual problems: consider the corporation sole in
English law and the Einmanngcsellschaft in German law. (For the lattcr's triumphant march
across Europe see Council Directive 89/667.)
86. Alssubjekt von Rechlen und Verbindlichkeilen wird das Vermbgen selbst gcdacht, zu
welchem sic gehOren. (The patrimony itself is considered the subject of the rights and
obligations which pertain to it.) B. Windscheid Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts. (Vol.1, p.223
of 8th edn.)
87. The English text (which is also authentic) reads: "The trust property, consisting of the
property transferred, constitutes a patrimony by appropriation, autonomous and distinct
from that of the settlor, trustee or beneficiary, and in which none of them has any real right."
For discussion of this provision see J. E. C. Brierley, 1995 Revue Internationale de Droit
Compart 33. For an attempt (before the new code) to come to terms with the trust see
Marcel Faribault, De la Fiducie dans la Province de Qutbec (1936).
88. "// est ... impossible de iraduire les droits du trustee comme itant ceux d'un
'proprittaire' dans notre conception de la propriiti. Le trustee n 'a ni I'usus ...ni le fructus...
ni I'abusus." (1955) 7 Revue Internationale de Droit Compart 318, at 319. Usus, fruatis and
abusus were in the ins commune taken as the essence of ownership.
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recognises a special patrimony, one is committed to seeing that patrimony
either as a person or as a quasi-person.89 Special patrimonies tend to
function as persons, and historically they have shown a tendency to
become persons. Lepaulle suggested that it might be better to conceptual-
ise trusts as persons.90 South African law at one time came close to doing
so.91 The Qu6bec trust goes as far as it is possible to go without actually
passing over into personality. Indeed, one might even ask whether, after
all, that boundary has not in fact been crossed. In ordinary language the
noun "trust" is a person-word. Idiom treats it like "company". "This land
is owned by a trust." "These shares are held by a trust." "Trusts are
lucrative clients." "The trust is liable for this debt." Ordinary language is
right.92
VII. TRUSTEESHIP AS AN OFFICE
IN his various writings on trust law, Honore" has emphasised the concept
of "office," and through his influence this has become a key idea in South
African trust law. The trustees may hand over to other trustees, and
thereafter be freed from further responsibility: this is a form of universal
succession, for the new trustees succeed to the whole assets and liabilities
of the special patrimony, but it is a universal succession which can occur
inter vivos. Moreover, the trustee, as the holder of an office, is removable
and replaceable by the court: this is a striking contrast to purely
89. K. W. Ryan (at (1961) 10 I.C.L.Q. 265) criticises Lepaulle for failing to distinguish
between ZweckvermOgen and SondervermOgen (special patrimony). But Lepaulle's point is
precisely that a trust is both a Sondervermdgen and a ZweckvermOgen. At n.21 Ryan writes
that "the concept of SondervermOgen has ... nothing to do with legal personality." This is
too strong. It is literally tine that in the Cemeines Rechl a SondervermOgen was not a person,
and that remains true in, for instance, modern German law. But this literal truth misses the
substantive truth.
90. For instance: "La solution la plus efficace el la plus simple est de doter le trust de la
personne morale." ("The most effective solution is to endow the trust with juristic
personality." (1952) 4 Revue Internationale de Droit Compart 377. Ansay's approach is
comparable: see his valuable "Third Way?" in J. Basedow, K. J. Hopt & H. Kotz (Eds),
Festschrift far Ulrich Drobnig (1998). Swiss international private law seems to treat foreign
companies as persons: see N. Poncet, "Trusts and Switzerland" (1998) 26 International
Business Lawyer 114.
91. See cases cited in A. M. Honore1 & E. Cameron, Honori's South African Law of
Trusts (4th edn, 1992), p.53. South Africa is an interesting source of ideas as to how the trust
should be integrated into a basically civilian system. The inter vivos trust tends to be
explained on the basis of the stipulatio alteri. And until Braun v. Blann & Botha NNO1984 2
S.A. 850 the trust was often classified as a form of fideicommissum. The relationship
between the fideicommissum and the trust is a subject which cannot be entered into here.
(See further David Johnston, The Roman Law of Trusts (1988).) Fideicommissary
substitution is a long way from the trust, but the fideicommissum purum is certainly
trust-like. Fideicommissum was one of the sources of the Scottish trust.
92. If one thinks of a trust as a person, then trustees transmogrify themselves into
representatives of that person, as directors are the representatives of a company. In this
connection I cannot forbear to mention sJ23 of the US Federal Bankruptcy Code which
describes the trustee as being the "representative of the estate." However, there can be little
doubt that this personalisation of the estate was unintended.
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contractual arrangements. The contrast with, say, the German TreuhUn-
der is a striking one. Honor6 argues that "it is the office that makes the
difference between entrusting and trust."93 The fact that a beneficiary
who is dissatisfied with his trustee may ask the court to appoint a new
trustee is so familiar that we forget how remarkable it is. Imagine a debtor
who, if he is dissatisfied with his creditor, may ask the court for a better
one. That is the trust. Honord's concept of office is an important one.*1
Trust is patrimony, plus office.
VIII. DOES IT ALL MATTER ANYWAY?
WHO cares how the trust should be conceptualised? One reason is that if
there is to be legal science, Rechtswissenschaft, there must be taxonomy.
In principle taxonomies can be changed: it may be said that if the trust
does not fit into a traditional ius commune taxonomy, then so much worse
for the taxonomy. But altering a taxonomic system is as inconvenient as
changing the classification system in an ancient library. If we are serious
about law, trusts must be located in the system.
Another reason is that the trust is expansive. It is expansive in that
some jurisdictions have adopted it while others are thinking of doing so,
arid it is also expansive in that even those jurisdictions which do not have
it increasingly often have to deal with trusts—even if they have not
acceded to the Hague Convention on the Recognition of Trusts. How the
trust should be conceptualised is thus a current issue. In 1992 a serious
attempt was made to introduce the trust into French law.9* There are
pressures to introduce it to Belgian law, to Dutch law and to other
systems. One detailed proposal by a distinguished Belgian lawyer would
provide that ownership is vested in the beneficiaries while the trustee has
a "real right of administration", an interesting conception which would be
a sort of cross between the trust and the bewind.96 The issues discussed in
this article are of practical importance. It is important that lawyers in the
civil law tradition understand that the trust is not a "unique institution"
and has no necessary connection with equity.
93. "Obstacles to the Reception of the Trust? The Examples of South Africa and
Scotland" in A. M. Rabello (Ed.), Aequitas and Equity (1997).
94. There may be scope for debate as to whether the element of office is truly essential to
the trust. (In South African law the answer is affirmative.)
95. " Lafiducie est un contrat par lequel un constituant transfire tout ou panic de ses biens
et droits a unefiduciare qui, tenant ces biens et droits siparts de son patrimoine personnel, agit
dans un but ditermini ail profit d'unou plusieurs blnificiarcs conformtment awe stipulations
du contrat." {Fiducie is a contractual arrangement whereby a settlor transfers all or part of
his assets and rights to a fiduciary, who holds such assets and rights separately from his
personal patrimony, and acts according to a determinate objective for the benefit of one or
more beneficiaries in accordance with the terms of the contract.) French text from F.
Sonneveldt (Ed.), Trust: Bridge or Abyss between Common and Civil Jurisdictions? (1992)
p.68. For discussion see P. Rgrny, "National Report for France" in D. J. Hayton, S. C. J. J.
Kortmann and H. L. E. Verhagen (Eds). Principles of European Trust Law (1999).
96. See Matthias Storme in J. H. Herbots (Ed.), Le Trust et la Fiducie (1997).
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Finally, clear analysis shows why the trust, though immensely useful, is
also dangerous. Legal systems have tended to agree that juristic
personality, because of its dramatic consequences, should be subject to
certain conditions, including (with some minor exceptions) the require-
ment of publicity. Yet the trust, which can be created by a private and
even secret act, comes close to being a juristic person. Seen in that light,
one can understand why many legal systems have traditionally been so
reluctant to recognise special patrimonies. Legal systems contemplating
the reception of the trust should be conscious of the implications of such a
reception.
IX. SCOTS LAW
SCOTS law is a mixed system. Some areas are derived from English law,
others are civilian, while others are home-grown. Scots property law is
particularly civilian, and yet Scotland not only has the trust but has had it
for a long time—at least since the 17th century—and has it by common
law rather than by enactment,97 (unlike those other civilian or mixed
systems which have the trust, such as South Africa,98 Quebec,99 Sri
Lanka,100 Louisiana,101 Mexico,102 Panama, Puerto Rico, Liechtenstein
and so on). It is a native species, rather than an introduced one. It is
integrated into the legal ecology. Especially and crucially, it is integrated
into a property law system which is civilian.103 Everyone thinks his own
system to be of galactic importance, but Scots law does have a special
significance in the area of trusts. As such, it deserves the attention of
comparatists, an attention which it has not sufficiently received. Lawson
was an exception. Scots law locates ownership in the trustee,104 and
classifies the rights of beneficiaries as simple personal rights, but yet has
97. For Ihe origins of ihe trust in Scotland see Gretton, "Scotland: The Evolution of the
Trust in a Semi-Civilian System" In Richard Helmholz & Reinhard ZJmmcrmann (Eds),
Itinera Fiduciae: Trust and Treuhand in Historical Perspective (1998).
98. See Tony Honori, "Trust" in Reinhard Zimmermann & Daniel Visser, Southern
Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996).
99. See above.
100. See L. J. M. Cooray, The Reception in Ceylon of the English Trust (1971).
101. See L. Oppenheim, "The Drafting of a Trust Code in a Civil Law Jurisdiction" in
W. A. Wilson (Ed.), Trusts and Trust-like Devices (1981).
102. See further R. M. Pasquel, "The Mexican Fideicomiso: The Reception Evolution and
Present Status of the Common Law Trust in a Civil Law Country" (1969) 8 Columbia
Journal of Transnational Law 54. This contains an account of the influence of Lepaulle's
thought on Mexican law.
103. But one must not exaggerate the clarity of Scots law in this area. The idea that the
right of a beneficiary might be real was often toyed with, even in our own times. A leading
scholar, W. A. Wilson, wrote in 1981 that the insistence of the Scottish courts that "the
beneficiary has merely a personal right" was "regrettable." (W. A. Wilson (Ed.), Trusts and
Trust-like Devices (1981), at 239.
104. Already in 1681 Lord Stair laid it down that whilst "the property of the thing
intrusted, be it land or movcablex, is in the person of the intrusted, else it is not a proper
trust." (Institutions of the Law of Scotland 1,13,7.)
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an apparatus of trust law which is, if not quite as extensive and
sophisticated105 as that of English law, yet able to do pretty well
everything that business people can fairly ask for. In saying this, I wish to
make no special claim for the sagacity of Scots law. Scots law did not
consciously take the concept of patrimonium and then develop it
eleganter. A legal system which decides to have a trust concept which is to
be functionally comparable to the English trust (and the English trust
was, especially in the second half of the 19th century, a major influence on
the Scottish trust), but which at the same time wishes to preserve its
property law system and thus is not prepared to accept equity, really has
only one direction to move in. Even today it would be untrue to say that
Scots lawyers have fully clarified their thinking about the nature of the
trust.105 Nevertheless, Scots law has something here of interest to the
world.107
105. Nor quite as frightening for the civilian?
106. Scottish universities should teach trusts as part of the law of persons, but, following
English practice, they usually teach the subject as part of property law. And the Scotland
Act 1998, in defining "private law" includes trusts under property, not persons. (See s.126.
The definition is, incidentally, of the greatest interest to comparatisls. It defines private law
as (1) general part, (2) persons, (3) obligations, (4) property, (5) actions. This is the classical
Roman taxonomy of penonae, res et acliones (with "things" divided into obligations and
property) plus the pandectisl general part.
107. It is encouraging to see that the Scottish experience may prove influential if the
Netherlands adopts the trust: see S. C. J. J. Kortmann and H. L. E. Verhagcn, "National
Report for the Netherlands" in D. J. Hayton, S. C J. J. Kortmann and H. L. E. Verhagen
(Eds), Principles of European Trust Law (1999). The "National Report for Scotland" (by
K. G. C. Reid) in this volume is of value.
